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GROCE V. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AFFIRMATIVE COMBUSTION IN PENNSYLVANIA
I. INTRODUCTION
The nation's metropolitan and urban areas have been steadily
growing in population.' This rise in urbanization has led to a
steady increase in both the amount and complexity of air pollution
in the United States.2 The increased intensity of air pollution has
"resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare,
including injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and
the deterioration of property, and hazards to air and ground
transportation."3
To combat this increase in air pollution and preserve the na-
tion's environmental and public health,4 Congress passed the Clean
Air Act (CAA),5 which delegated responsibility for the prevention
and control of air pollution to state and local governments. 6 Under
the CAA, each State must submit a State Implementation Plan (SIP)
which outlines that state's chosen methods for the control and pre-
vention of air pollution.7 Furthermore, the CAA requires each state
to submit its SIP to the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) for approval.8 The EPA accepted Pennsylvania's SIP,
which requires the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Pro-
tection (DEP) to approve the plans for any proposed facility that
would emit air pollutants.9
The DEP's approval of a proposed plan, however, can be ad-
ministratively challenged and subsequently appealed to the Penn-
1. See Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a) (1) (2007) (describing recent
population increase in urban areas in United States).
2. See id. § 7401 (a) (2) (detailing air pollution effects from urbanization and
industrialization).
3. Id. (listing negative environmental impacts of air pollution).
4. See id. § 7401(b) (1) (describing CAA's purpose and goals).
5. CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2007).
6. See id. § 7401 (a) (3) (delegating responsibility of air pollution prevention
and control).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (explaining responsibilities of states under
CAA).
8. Id. (explaining system under CAA by which States would submit implemen-
tation plan to EPA for approval).
9. See Groce v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 921 A.2d 567, 571 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007)
(describing Pennsylvania's SIP requirements). For a further discussion of Penn-
sylvania's SIP, see infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
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sylvania Environmental Hearing Board (EHB) and further to the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.' 0 In Groce v. Department of
Environmental Protection (Groce),l I certain citizens and environmen-
tal organizations (collectively the Association) appealed the DEP's
approval of a plan (Plan Approval) to construct an electric power
plant facility in Pennsylvania. 12 The EHB dismissed the appeal, and
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania subsequently affirmed.' 3
The Association's appeal in Groce concerned objections to the
proposed construction of a Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) com-
bustion facility that would generate electricity by burning waste
coal.14 This Note focuses on the uses and benefits of such a CFB
facility. This Note also analyzes the DEP's approval of the proposed
plan for the Facility and considers whether the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania properly affirmed the EHB's validation of
that approval.
Section II of this Note discusses the facts underlying the Groce
case. 15 Section III develops and explores the relevant statutes and
case law regarding the CAA, Pennsylvania's SIP, and the process by
which the DEP promulgates regulations. 16 Section IV explores the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania's reasoning in affirming the
EHB's decision to uphold the DEP's Plan Approval for the CFB fa-
cility. 17 Section V provides a critical analysis of the court's affirma-
tion of the EHB's decision regarding CFB combustors and the
10. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 572-73 (noting DEP's approval susceptible to
challenge).
11. 921 A.2d 567 (Pa Commw Ct. 2007).
12. See id. (detailing Association's challenges to Plan Approval). The Associa-
tion was comprised of Dennis Groce, the National Parks Conservation Association,
the Group Against Smog and Pollution, and Phil Coleman. Id. at 570.
13. Id. at 573, 585 (establishing EHB's dismissal of appeal and Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania's affirmation of dismissal).
14. See id. at 570-73 (setting forth appeal of DEP's plan approval to Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania).
15. For a further discussion of the facts surrounding the Wellington Facility
and the Association's appeal, see infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of statutes and case law surrounding the CAA, see
infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Penn-
sylvania's SIP and the DEP's issuance of a plan approval, see infra notes 34-42 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of CFB combustors, see infra notes 43-
58 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the standard of review of
EHB decisions, see infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. For a further discus-
sion of agency deference, see infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. For a fur-
ther discussion of the differences between regulations and statements of policy, see
infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the Fye v.
United States standard of evidence, see infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
17. For a further analysis of the Commonwealth Court's holding and reason-
ing, see infra notes 77-111 and accompanying text.
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DEP's statutory interpretations in issuing the Plan Approval.18 Fi-
nally, Section VI explores the impact of the court's decision on
both the future of CFB facilities in Pennsylvania as well as an
agency's statutory interpretations in general.19
II. FACTS
In Groce, Wellington Development-WVDT-LLC (Wellington)
sought to construct a new electric power plant.20 Wellington filed
an application with the DEP, proposing to build a 525-megawatt
electrical power generation facility (Facility) in Cumberland Town-
ship, Greene County, Pennsylvania.21 The Facility would use two
CFB combustors to burn coal in order to produce steam that would
then be used to generate electricity. 22 Concern arose, however,
that the Facility's combustion of coal would result in the emission
of various air pollutants, such as Sulfur Dioxide (SO 2) and Nitrous
Oxides (NOx), which are regulated under the CAA.2 3
On July 21, 2005, the DEP approved Wellington's plan for the
Facility's construction in an area that met air quality standards for
SO 2 , but not for NO,. 24 Prior to the Plan Approval, Wellington and
the DEP met with the Federal Land Managers (FLM) responsible
for evaluating the Facility's impact on four areas designated as
"Class I" areas under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
(PSD) guidelines. 25 After reviewing Wellington's application, the
18. For a further analysis of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania's affir-
mation of CFB combustors and the DEP's statutory interpretations, see infra notes
112-142 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the impacts of the DEP's issuance of a plan
approval, see infra notes 143-161 and accompanying text.
20. See Groce v. Dep't of EnvIl. Prot., 921 A.2d at 570 (listing parties involved in
case).
21. See id. at 570-71 (explaining details of Wellington's plan for construction
of electrical facility).
22. See id. (detailing process through which Wellington's facility would gener-
ate electricity). The two CFB combustors generate steam by burning a combina-
tion of 15% run of mine coal and 85% bituminous waste coal. Id. For further
discussion of CFB combustors and waste coal, see infra notes 43-58 and accompany-
ing text.
23. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 571 (explaining why Facility falls under CAA
regulations).
24. Id. at 572 (stating initial approval of Facility). For a further discussion of
air quality standards and compliance, see infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
25. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 572 (reviewing way in which Wellington and DEP
went through application process). The four areas that were evaluated for poten-
tial impact from the emissions from the facility were: (1) Otter Creek; (2) Dolly
Sods Wilderness in the Monongahela National Forest in West Virginia; (3) James
River Face Wilderness Area in the Thomas Jefferson National Forest in Virginia;
and (4) Shenandoah National Park in Virginia. Id. For a further discussion of the
2008]
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DEP published a notice of intent to issue a plan approval, which
included notice of the degree of increment consumption for Class
II areas only.2 6
The Association appealed the Plan Approval on numerous
grounds: (1) the Plan Approval failed to require the proper emis-
sion standards for NO,; (2) the Plan Approval was based on an in-
adequate analysis of the impact to the Shenandoah National Park
(Shenandoah) in Virginia, which would potentially be affected by
the pollution emissions; (3) the Plan Approval did not include an
"adequate increment consumption analysis" for Shenandoah under
the PSD program; (4) the Plan Approval did not "require adequate
mitigation of adverse impacts on visibility in Shenandoah[;]" (5)
the Plan Approval failed to include emission limits that reflect the
Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) for NO, emissions; (6)
the DEP did not provide public notice for the expected increment
consumption for Class I areas; (7) the DEP did not provide "ade-
quate notice, necessary information or allow adequate time for re-
view and comment on the application to the FLM;" and (8) the
DEP approved the plan in violation of 40 C.F.R. sections 52.21(k)
and (1).27
The EHB dismissed the Association's appeal following an ex-
tensive de novo review.28 Upon the EHB's dismissal, the Association
appealed the decision to the Commonwealth Court of Penn-
role of FLMs and the Class designations established by the PSD requirements, see
infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
26. Groce, 921 A.2d at 572 (detailing steps taken by DEP in issuing Plan Ap-
proval). The notice of intent also contained a notice of a public conference and,
in response to public comments from the notice of intent, the DEP required sev-
eral significant changes to the Plan Approval. Id. The Plan Approval was modified
on September 1, 2005; on December 17, 2005 (to provide notice on the degree of
increment consumption for the Class I areas that were omitted from the previous
notices); on January 14, 2006; and on June 12, 2006. Id.
27. Id. at 572-73 (listing grounds of Association's appeal). For a further dis-
cussion of LAER, see infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
28. Groce, 921 A.2d at 573 (stating EHB's dismissal of Association's appeal).
The EHB based its dismissal on the following findings: (1) that the NO, emission
limits set by the DEP met the appropriate LAER requirement; (2) that the DEP
properly determined that Wellington's facility would not cause or contribute to an
increment violation at Shenandoah; (3) that the DEP properly determined that
the mitigation measures would adequately protect the AQRVs at Shenandoah; (4)
that although the DEP erred in not providing notice of the increment consump-
tion of Class I areas in its initial notice, the supplemental notice provided adequate
notice and opportunity for public comment; and (5) that the DEP correctly inter-
preted 25 PA. CODE § 127.45(4) in regards to publishing notice of the degree of
increment consumption. Id.
4
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sylvania.2 9 The court subsequently upheld the EHB's dismissal of
the appeal, thereby validating the Plan Approval. 30
III. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative Basis
Congress enacted the CAA primarily to "protect and enhance
the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population. '31
In combination with the CAA, Congress entrusted the EPA with es-
tablishing the maximum concentration of various air pollutants
through National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).32 An
area subject to these limitations may be in compliance or "attain-
ment" with the NAAQS for some pollutants, but in noncompliance,
or "nonattainment," for other pollutants.33 A source of pollution in
attainment is subject to PSD requirements, whereas a source in
nonattainment is subject to New Source Review (NSR)
requirements.3 4
Pennsylvania's SIP adopted the Federal PSD regulations with
one exception: the DEP, not the EPA, acts as the agency of author-
ity.35 The Federal PSD regulations separated the United States into
three classes and specified which geographic areas would fit into
each class.3 6 In addition, the PSD regulations establish that FLMs
in charge of Class I areas "have an affirmative responsibility to pro-
tect the air quality related values (including visibility) of such lands"
and to determine "whether a proposed source or modification will
29. Id. (explaining Association's actions following EHB dismissal).
30. See id. (reporting Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania's affirmation of
EHB decision dismissing Association's challenge to DEP Plan Approval).
31. See CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (1) (2007) (setting forth purpose of CAA).
32. See CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (a) (1) (A) (describing role of EPA in setting
NAAQS and furthering goals of CAA).
33. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 571 (explaining effect of NAAQS on air pollutant
designations in various geographical areas).
34. Id. (describing range standards to be applied to areas in attainment and
nonattainment). For a further discussion of the NSR requirements, see infra notes
41-42 and accompanying text.
35. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 571 (detailing role of Pennsylvania's SIP); see also
DEP Adoption of Program, 25 PA. CODE § 127.83 (2007) (detailing Pennsylvania's
adoption of federal PSD requirements).
36. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality, 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21 (e) (2007) (establishing designation of United States into three classes).
The Classes were designated by the type of area; for example, international parks,
national wilderness areas exceeding 5,000 acres in size, and national memorial
parks which exceed 5,000 acres in size were Class I areas. Prevention of Significant
Deterioration of Air Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (e) (1) (i)-(iii).
2008] 409
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have an adverse impact on such values."37 Furthermore, the PSD
regulations establish the amount of a particular pollutant that
could be added to an area without jeopardizing that area's attain-
ment status, which is referred to as the "allowable increment."38
A facility, subject to PSD review and seeking Plan Approval by
the DEP, must demonstrate that the facility's emissions will not
"cause or contribute" to air pollution in excess of the allowable in-
crement.39 The DEP is also required to publish a notice of action
on intended plan approvals for new facilities subject to either PSD
or NSR review. 40 In addition, notice given for a source subject to
PSD review must also include the degree of increment consump-
tion expected to result.4 1
Pennsylvania's SIP also adopted the federal NSR regulations,
which require compliance with the LAER for pollutant emissions
from a facility in an area of nonattainment. 42 The LAER standard is
defined in the SIP as the lowest emission rate based on the more
stringent of either: (1) the emission limitation of a SIP for the class
or category of the proposed source, unless it is demonstrated by the
owner of the proposed source that the limitation is not achievable;
or (2) the emission limitation achieved in practice by the class or
category of the source. 43
B. CFB Combustors and Waste Coal
CFB combustors are a relatively new development in the elec-
tric power industry.44 The combustor itself is comprised of a large
37. Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality, 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21(p) (2) (2007) (explaining responsibility of FLMs in Class I areas).
38. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality, 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21 (b) (13) (ii) (a)-(b) (establishing baseline concentrations for individual areas
will not include actual emissions).
39. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality, 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21(k) (setting forth requirements for new source to receive Plan Approval).
40. SeeDEP Adoption of Program, 25 PA. CODE § 127.44(a)(1)-(2) (2007) (re-
quiring notice on action taken on plan approvals for sources subject to (1) PSD
and (2) NSR regulations).
41. SeeDEP Contents of Notice, 25 PA. CODE § 127.45(4) (2007) (setting forth
notice requirements regarding PSD).
42. See Groce v. Dep't Envtl. Prot., 921 A.2d 567, 571 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007)
(detailing requirements of Pennsylvania's SIP).
43. See DEP Definitions, 25 PA. CODE § 121.1 (2007) (defining LAER).
44. See Nat'l Energy Tech. Laboratory, Clean Coal Power Now Serving Cus-
tomers in Jacksonville, FL: DOE, Local Officials Commemorate One of World's
Cleanest Coal Plants; Awards Begin Coming from Power Publications (Oct. 14,
2002), http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/press/2002/d-cct-jea.html
(describing CFB project undertaken in Jacksonville, FL and noting innovative
technology).
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furnace that burns coal in order to boil water and create steam,
which then drives a turbine connected to an electric generator. 45
The solid coal used for fuel is first crushed to the relative size of
sand and mixed with limestone. 46 The coal and limestone mixture
is then blown into the base of the combustor using heated air, ignit-
ing as it rises. 47 Next, the hot ash and limestone created from the
combustion are separated in a "cyclone" and recycled back into the
combustor through superheated tubes which aid in producing
steam. 48 When the hot gases finally leave the cyclone, they enter
additional "reheater/superheater" tubes which also generate
steam. 49 Finally, the hot gas is sent through a polishing scrubber
and then through fabric filters that absorb pollutants in the gas
before being released from the facility through a stack.50
The CFB combustor has many advantages over other types of
combustion facilities. 51 First, CFB combustors use lower grade
coals, such as waste coal. 52 Waste coal, or garbage of bituminous
45. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, THE JEA ATMOSPHERIC FLUIDIZED BED
COMBUSTOR CLEAN COAL PROJECT: REPOWERING NORTHSIDE UNITS 1 AND 2 (Oct.
2001), http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/coalpower/cctc/cctdp/biblio
graphy/demonstration/pdfs/acks/JEA.BROO.pdf (providing overview of CFB
combustors).
46. See id. (explaining features of CFB combustors).
47. See id. (detailing process by which CFB combustors burn fuel). The burn-
ing of the fuel and limestone mixture is conducted through a "slow burn" which
stabilizes temperatures to below 1600'F. Id. This "slow burn" process is used to
prevent excessive NO, formations. Id. At the top of the combustor, ammonia is
also added to aid in limiting NO, emissions. Id. NO. is a precursor to ground-level
ozone and can cause serious respiratory problems and can contribute to form acid
rain and toxic chemicals and is a contributor to global warming. EPA, Nitrogen
Oxides: Chief Causes for Concern, http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/nox/chf
.html (July 23, 2007) (listing dangers of NO,).
48. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, THE JEA ATMOSPHERIC FLUIDIZED BED
COMBUSTOR CLEAN COAL PROJECT: REPOWERING NORTHSIDE UNITS 1 AND 2 (Oct.
2001), http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/coalpower/cctc/cctdp/biblio
graphy/demonstration/pdfs/jacks/JEABROO.pdf (describing method by which
ash and limestone are recycled back into combustor).
49. See id. (explaining process of generating additional steam).
50. See id. (detailing process of cleaning gas to remove pollutants). In addi-
tion to the reduction of NO, emissions that are reduced through the "slow burn"
process, the polishing scrubbers and fabric filters act to reduce the amount of SO 2
emitted as well. Id.
51. See U.S. Department of Energy, http://www.eh.doe.gov/nepa/docs/deis/
eis0289/sectionl.pdf, page 4 (last visited Jan. 13, 2008) (describing advantages of
CFB combustors over traditional combustors); see also U.S. Department of Energy,
supra note 44 (explaining CFB combustor benefit of fuel-flexibility).
52. See David Ivanovich, Turning Coal Waste Into Light, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Oct. 8, 2004, available at http://www.energybulletin.net/2453.html (stating fuel
source for CFB combustor plant).
2008]
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(GOB) coal, is the waste created as a by-product of coal mining. 53
Mine operators have typically dumped GOB coal outside of the
mines because the coal's low energy content is unattractive to cus-
tomers. 54 Large piles of waste coal can cause sulfuric acid and hy-
drogen sulfide runoff, which can severely pollute streams and kill
local aquatic wildlife. 55 Therefore, a major environmental advan-
tage of CFB combustors is that the combustors use and burn waste
coal, preventing such negative environmental impacts.56
Second, CFB combustors can also lead to economic benefits.5 7
It can take millions of dollars and many years to clean up the nu-
merous waste coal piles found in the Eastern United States.58 In
situations where the CFB facility is situated near a waste coal pile,
however, the cost of using the waste coal may only be that of trans-
porting the coal to the facility.
5 9
C. Standard of Review of an EHB Decision
Where the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania is reviewing
an EHB decision,
the court shall affirm the adjudication unless it shall find
that the adjudication is in violation of the constitutional
rights of the appellant, or is not in accordance with law, or
that the provisions of Subchapter A of Chapter 5 (relating
to practice and procedure of Commonwealth agencies)
have been violated in the proceedings before the agency,
or that any finding of fact made by the agency and neces-
sary to support its adjudication is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence. 60
53. See Tom Pelton, US: Md. Coal Mining Toxic Legacy (Dec. 8, 2006), http:/
/www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14258 (explaining source of GOB coal).
54. See Ivanovich, supra note 51 (explaining how GOB piles formed).
55. Id. (detailing environmental hazards of waste coal). Additionally, the ex-
cess waste coal, or GOB piles, have been known to ignite and further pollute local
waters. Id.
56. See id. (recognizing that CFB facility would alleviate dangers by using
waste coal as fuel).
57. See id. (stating that using waste coal as fuel source would essentially be
free).
58. See Pelton, supra note 52 (estimating cost of $52 million and three decades
to clean up Maryland's most endangered areas).
59. See Ivanovich, supra note 51 (positing that only cost incurred in having
CFB facility would be in transporting coal from pile to facility).
60. See 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 704 (West 2007) (establishing standard of
review). Additionally, "questions of resolving conflicts in the evidence, witness
credibility, and evidentiary weight are within the exclusive discretion of the EHB,
the fact finding agency, and are not matters for a reviewing court." Pennsylvania
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This standard has been upheld in numerous cases, including Leath-
erwood Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection (Leatherwood) ,61 a
leading case. 62 Leatherwood involved the revocation of a DEP plan
approval issued with respect to the construction of a solid waste
landfill.63 In upholding the EHB's revocation, the court repeatedly
noted that the EHB did not commit any errors of law and that its
findings were supported by substantial evidence. 64
D. Agency Deference and Statutory Interpretation
Although a court may review an agency's interpretation of stat-
utes, "agencies are entitled to deference in interpreting the statutes
that they enforce and.., a reviewing court must put aside its discre-
tion [in favor of the] expertise of the administrative agency."65 As a
result, statutory interpretations of an agency, such as the DEP, will
not be overturned unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. 66
In Brunner v. Department of Environmental Protection (Brunner) ,67 the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania applied this standard to in-
validate an erroneous DEP interpretation; the court concluded that
the DEP's interpretation read words into a statute that were not
found in the language of the statute itself.68
Trout v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 863 A.2d 93, 104 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (internal
citations omitted) (noting evidentiary review and credibility determinations are
responsibility of EHB, not reviewing court).
61. 819 A.2d 604 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
62. See id. at 610 (citing Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. N. Am. Refractofies Co., 791 A.2d
461 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)) (explaining standard of review of an EHB decision);
see also T.R.A.S.H., Ltd., v. Commw. of Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 574 A.2d 721, 723
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (describing scope of review of EHB decisions); Kish v.
Annville-Cleona Sch. Dist., 645 A.2d 361, 364 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (holding
substantial evidence is more than mere scintilla of evidence).
63. See Leatherwood, 819 A.2d at 606 (providing brief background of case).
64. Id. at 614 (holding that reviewing court will not disturb EHB's findings
where findings are supported by substantial evidence).
65. See SUNOCO, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 865 A.2d 960, 970 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2005) (quoting Shawnee Dev., Inc. v. Commw., 799 A.2d 882, 889 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2002) (stating standard of deference to agencies by courts); see also Alpha Auto
Sales, Inc. v. Dep't of State, Bureau of Prof't and Occupational Affairs, 644 A.2d
153, 155 (Pa. 1994) (internal citations omitted) (recognizing agencies are entitled
to great deference in their interpretations of statutes they are responsible for
enforcing).
66. See Oley Twp. v. Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 710 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1998) (citing Hatchard v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 612 A.2d 621, 624 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992)) (recognizing standard for reviewing agency statutory
interpretations).
67. 869 A.2d 1172 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
68. See id. at 1174 (finding DEP interpretation to be erroneous). The DEP
argued in Brunner that Section 6301 in Title 27 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated
Statutes, requiring a $4 fee for each ton of waste disposed of at a landfill, did not
2008]
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E. Regulation vs. Statement of Policy
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Documents Law (CDL) sets
forth the process by which an agency issues a new regulation, in-
cluding public notice of the proposed regulation, receiving com-
ments on the regulation from interested parties, and holding
hearings when appropriate. 69 Significant within the CDL, however,
is the exception that an agency's statement of policy, as opposed to
a regulation, merely tracks a statute and need not be issued in ac-
cordance with the CDL.70
In Central Dauphin School District v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Department of Education (Central Dauphin),71 the relationship be-
tween a regulation and a statement of policy was further ex-
plored.72  There, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
differentiated regulations and statements of policy, and found that
a regulation "establishes a standard of conduct which has the force
include sand used as an alternate daily cover unless that sand was from a resource
recovery facility. Id. at 1173. The court, in rejecting the DEP's interpretation, fo-
cused on the language from the dissent of the EHB decision upholding the DEP's
interpretation, which stated that the erroneous nature of the DEP's interpretation
was that it "tends to add words that simply are not there. The statute says that the
new fee shall not apply to process residue and nonprocessible waste that is used in
defined ways. It does not say process residue and nonprocessible waste from a 're-
source recovery facility.'" Id. at 1174. The issue, as the court pointed out, was that
the words "resource recovery facility" were not contained within section 6301, but
were inferred by the DEP. Id. Additionally, the Brunnercourt noted that, pursuant
to Section 1921(b) in Title 1 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, "[w]hen
the words of the statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not
to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." Id. (citing 1 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1921(b) (West 2007)).
69. See Woods Servs., Inc. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 803 A.2d 260, 265 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2002) (citing 45 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1102-602 (West 2007)) (es-
tablishing issuance procedure agency regulations).
70. See Woods Sers., Inc., 803 A.2d at 265 (recognizing CDL treats issuances of
regulations and statements of policy differently). A regulation, as defined in the
CDL, means "any rule or regulation, or order in the nature of a rule or regulation,
promulgated by an agency under statutory authority in the administration of any
statute administered by or relating to the agency, or prescribing the practice or
procedure before such agency." 45 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102(12) (West 2007).
The CDL, however, defines a statement of policy as:
any document, except an adjudication or a regulation, promulgated by
an agency which sets forth substantive or procedural personal or property
rights, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities or obligations of the pub-
lic or any part thereof, and includes, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, any document interpreting or implementing any act of
Assembly enforced or administered by such agency.
§ 1102(13).
71. 608 A.2d 576 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992)
72. See id. at 580-81 (setting forth definitions of regulation and statements of
policy).
10
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of law." 73 A statement of policy, in contrast, does not establish a
"binding norm," but merely indicates the agency's "tentative inten-
tions for the future. '74 The court recognized that the test to deter-
mine whether an agency's action constitutes a regulation or merely
a statement of policy is the extent to which the action allows the
agency discretion in choosing to follow that action in an individual
case.
75
F. Frye v. United States76 Standard for Admitting Expert
Testimony
The test developed in Frye v. United States (Frye test) is the appli-
cable standard when a party wishes to introduce evidence and testi-
mony from an expert witness regarding a scientific matter, like
Wellington did in Groce.77 Under this test, the party wishing to in-
troduce the evidence must prove that the methodology and princi-
ples used by the expert have been generally accepted in the
relevant scientific community. 78
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Groce, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania had to de-
termine whether the EHB was correct in dismissing the Associa-
tion's appeal of the DEP's Plan Approval. 79 After reviewing the
various issues raised by the Association, the court affirmed the
EHB's decision. 80
73. See id. at 581 (quoting Pa. Human Relations Comm'n v. Norristown Area Sch.
Dist., 374 A.2d 671 (Pa. 1977)) (explaining legal effect of regulations).
74. Id. (establishing statements of policy are not legally binding).
75. See Cent. Dauphin, 608 A.2d at 581 (quoting Dep't of Envtl. Res. v. Rushton
Mining Co., 591 A.2d 1168 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)) (recognizing agency's discre-
tion in following pronouncement in individual cases is determinative of regulation
versus statement of policy). The Central Dauphin court concluded that the Depart-
ment of Education's action at issue constituted a statement of policy because the
Department of Education and the Secretary of Education would evaluate compli-
ance with their pronouncement on a case-by-case basis. Cent. Dauphin, 608 A.2d at
582.
76. 293 F. 213 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
77. See e.g. Commonwealth of Pa. v. Dengler, 890 A.2d 372, 382 (Pa. 2005)
(recognizing applicability of Frye test). The Dengler court stated that the only time
the Frye test applies is when a party wishes to introduce novel scientific evidence
obtained from the conclusions of an expert. Id. The evidence Wellington sought
to introduce was related to the methodology of modeling air quality. See Groce v.
Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., 921 A.2d 576, 580-81 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007).
78. See Dengler, 890 A.2d at 382 (explaining requirements of Frye test).
79. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 570 (stating main issue before Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania).
80. See id. at 574-85 (detailing Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania's analy-
sis of issues and EHB decision). Although the court addressed numerous issues,
2008]
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A. Class or Category and LAER Standard
The court first addressed the Association's argument that the
EHB erred in affirming the DEP's creation of a class or category of
source under the LAER requirements, called the CFB combustor.8 1
The court explained the means for determining the LAER standard
and focused on the language of "class or category" as it is used
within those means. 8 2 The court recognized, however, that "class or
category" was not defined in the requirements or in any other state
or federal law or regulation.8 3
As a result, the court instead focused on the DEP's methodol-
ogy in determining the Facility's "class or category" to ascertain
whether substantial evidence existed to support the DEP's determi-
nation.84 Specifically, the court analyzed the DEP's evidence on the
substantial differences between CFB combustors and other coal
burning units.8 5 Due to "substantial evidence of the significant dif-
several of those issues are not new or pertinent to the discussion of the DEP's Plan
Approval of a CFB combustor facility. The first issue was in regards to whether the
EHB had erred in finding that the testimony of one of Wellington's experts met
the Frye standard for scientific evidence. Id. at 580-81. The standard requires that
the party seeking to introduce the evidence prove that the general principles and
methodology of the expert have been accepted by the relevant scientific commu-
nity. Id. at 581 (quoting Tucker v. Cmty. Med. Ctr., 833 A.2d 217, 223-24 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2003) (internal citations omitted)); for a further discussion of the Frye test, see
supra notes 75-6 and accompanying text. Applying the Frye test, the Groce court
concluded that while the Wellington expert had refined the modeling test used to
measure the emissions from the Facility, the methodology had been generally ac-
cepted and the Association had an opportunity to cross-examine the expert. Groce,
921 A.2d at 581. As a result, the EHB did not err in finding that the methodology
used by the expert met the Frye test. Id. The second issue addressed by the court
involved the rules of evidence that govern the EHB, and whether the EHB erred in
excluding the opinions held in the FLM letters as hearsay. Id. at 582. In this re-
gard, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania concluded that the EHB did not
err in its exclusion of the opinions contained in the letters because the EHB was
required to hear the issue de novo and the DEP would not have an opportunity to
cross-examine the authors of the letter at trial. Id. at 582-83; for a further discus-
sion of the evidentiary responsibilities of the EHB and the standard of EHB review,
see supra note 59-63 and accompanying text.
81. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 574 (setting forth first issue addressed by Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania).
82. Id. at 574 (defining LAER). For a further discussion on the LAER defini-
tion and requirements, see supra note 41-42 and accompanying text.
83. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 574 (stating no definition of class or category has
been found).
84. See id. at 575 (explaining court's review of evidence on CFB combustors).
85. See id. (setting forth evidence in record of CFB combustors and Pulverized
Coal (PC) boilers). The evidence demonstrated that CFB combustors could burn
waste coal, which consisted of minerals and rock removed from coal during the
mining process, at a temperature of 1,600 to 1,8000 F. Id. PC boilers were not
capable of using waste coal as a fuel source, but were able to burn coal faster and at
higher temperatures than CFB combustors. Id. Furthermore, the way in which
12
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ferences in the properties of waste coal ... and the mechanisms for
burning [it]," the court concluded that the EHB did not err in up-
holding the DEP's creation of a CFB combustor class or category.
8 6
Additionally, the court addressed the Association's argument
that, even if the CFB combustor was a proper class, the EHB erred
in finding that the Facility achieved the lowest emission of any facil-
ity in its class for NO.. 8 7 The court applied the second method of
determining the LAER standard8 8 and reviewed the evidence on
record concerning the emission rate of the Facility compared to
other CFB facilities. 8 9 After examining the evidence, the court
found that no other CFB facility had achieved a lower NO,, emission
rate than the Facility in Groce, and the court consequently affirmed
the NO,, emission limitation imposed by the EHB.90
B. Significant Impact Levels
The court next addressed the DEP's use of Significant Impact
Levels (SILs) in determining whether the Facility would cause or
contribute to an increase in air pollution in violation of the PSD
allowable increment for Shenandoah. 9 1 The court began its analy-
sis with 40 C.F.R. section 52.21, which governs PSD review. 92 Specif-
ically, the court analyzed section 52.21(k), which requires the
owner or operator of a facility to demonstrate that the emissions
CFB combustors burn waste coal creates fewer emissions of SO 2 and NO, than
from PC boilers. Id. For a further discussion of CFB combustors, see supra notes
43-58 and accompanying text.
86. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 575 (holding EHB did not err in determining class
or category).
87. See id. at 575-76 (setting forth Association's argument in response to
EHB's creation of CFB class or category).
88. See DEP Definitions, 25 PA. CODE § 121.1 (2007) (declaring one LAER
standard as most stringent emission limitation achieved in practice by class or cate-
gory of source). The court stated, in a footnote, that it chose the second method
because "there was no evidence that any emission limitation in any SIP would be
more stringent than the Facility's emission limitation." Groce, 921 A.2d at 576 n.ll.
For a further discussion of the two methods to determine the LAER standard, see
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
89. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 576 (explaining court's method of reviewing deter-
mination that Facility achieved most stringent emission limit).
90. Id. (finding substantial evidence to support EHB's designated emission
limitation). The emission rate achieved by the Facility was calculated to be 0.1 lbs/
million British thermal units (MMBTU). Id. Based upon that calculation, the
EHB decided to impose a NO, emission limitation of 0.1 Ib/MMBTU. Id.
91. See id. (detailing Association's argument that EHB erred in allowing DEP
to use SILs). The Association contended that the EHB erred in allowing the DEP
to use SILs, arguing that any impact above zero prevented PSD approval. Id.
92. See generally Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality, 40
C.F.R. § 52.21 (2007) (defining PSD requirements); see also Groce 921 A.2d at 577
(examining PSD requirements for DEP plan approval).
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from that facility will not "cause or contribute" to air pollution in
violation of the allowable increment.93
The DEP interpreted section 52.21 (k) to mean that a facility
would only cause or contribute to an amount exceeding the incre-
ment if that contribution was greater than a de minimis threshold
(also known as a SIL).94 The DEP explained that its interpretation
was based on the Congressional intent of balancing the desire to
protect both air quality and the public health with the desire for
economic growth consistent with the preservation of clean air re-
sources.95 In reviewing the DEP's interpretation, the court recog-
nized that in 1990, the EPA drafted a new version of its New Source
Review Workshop Manual (NSR Workshop Manual), which in-
cluded SILs as a de minimis threshold.96 Although the NSR Work-
shop Manual had not been finalized, it was "considered
authoritative as a primary guidance document on the degree of in-
crement consumption and used regularly by professionals in the
field.97
The court thus affirmed the EHB decision, finding that the
DEP's SIL was de minimis, because the Facility's projected emissions
were only ten percent of the emissions allowed by the SIL.98 Addi-
tionally, the court agreed with the DEP that adopting the Associa-
tion's "non-zero" approach would be impractical because an
infinitesimally small reading by a computer projection did not nec-
essarily make the reading significant.99 The court, therefore, held
93. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 577 (describing Court's analysis of "cause or contrib-
ute"); see also Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality, 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21(k) (2007) (detailing "cause or contribute" limitation).
94. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 577 (explaining DEP's interpretation of 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21 (k)).
95. See id. at 577 n. 16 (quoting CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7470(1) (2007)) (stating
purpose of PSD requirements).
96. Id. at 577 (noting other sources using SIL).
97. Id. (detailing history, authority, and use of NSR Workshop Manual). The
NSR Workshop Manual provided that when a violation of an increment is pre-
dicted, the applicant can determine whether the net emissions increase from the
source would result in a significant ambient impact. Id. at 577 n.17. The source
would not be considered to cause or contribute to the violation if its own impact was
not significant at any violating receptor. Id.
98. Id. at 577 (comparing SIL limitations with projected emissions from Facil-
ity). The 24-hour SIL for SO was 0.2 micrograms per cubic meter, whereas the
projected emission from the Facility for the increment at Shenandoah was only
0.02 micrograms per cubic meter. Id. This finding was also based on the court's
definition of "contribute," which was "to play a significant part in bringing about an
end or result." Id. at 578 (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
285 (1989)) (defining "contribute") (emphasis added).
99. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 577-78 (concluding that Association's approach is
impracticable given current modeling technology). The Association had argued
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that the EHB did not err in accepting the DEP's interpretation of
"cause or contribute," based upon the DEP's adherence to Congres-
sional intent as well as substantial evidence that SILs had been regu-
larly used by professionals in the field.100
Furthermore, the court concluded that the DEP's interpreta-
tion of "contribute," as used in 40 C.F.R. section 52.21(k), was not
an attempt to promulgate a new regulation, but instead constituted
a statement of policy.' 10 The Association contested the DEP's inter-
pretation that a source would only consume the allowable incre-
ment if the source's contribution was above a de minimis threshold,
arguing that it imposed a "binding norm" through a new regulation
without following proper rulemaking procedures under the
CDL.102 The court, however, held that the DEP's interpretation of
"contribute" simply tracked the section 52.21 (k) requirement that
"emission increases from the proposed source not play a significant
part in air pollution."'10 3
C. Notice of Degree of Increment Consumption
The Association also contended that the DEP was required to
publish the degree of increment consumption for all Class I areas
under the notice requirement of 25 Pa. Code section 127.45.104
The statute requires that notice of a proposed plan approval con-
tain the expected "degree of increment consumption" for the
source at issue. 10 5 The problem, however, was that "degree of in-
crement consumption" was not defined in any state or federal regu-
lation. 10 6  The DEP interpreted "degree of increment
consumption" by following the NSR Workshop Manual, which
for a "non-zero" approach, in which any impact on air quality standards above zero
would prevent issuance of PSD approval. See id. at 576.
100. Id. at 578 (stating Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania's holding on
issue of SILs).
101. Id. (holding EHB did not err in allowing DEP to use SILs).
102. See id. (reiterating Association's argument). For a further discussion of
the Commonwealth Documents Law and the distinctions between regulations and
statements of policy, see supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
103. Id. (finding that DEP's interpretation was statement of policy and not
regulation).
104. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 579 (discussing Association's argument that EHB
erred in not requiring DEP to publish degree of increment consumption for all
affected Class I areas in notice of Plan Approval). For a further discussion of the
notice requirements set forth in Pennsylvania's SIP, see supra notes 39-40 and ac-
companying text.
105. SeeDEP Contents of Notice, 25 PA. CODE § 127.45(4) (2007) (listing no-
tice requirements).
106. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 579 (noting definitional limitations of
requirements).
2008]
15
Samlin: Groce v. Department of Environmental Protection: Affirmative Comb
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
420 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouILNAL [Vol. XIX: p. 405
stated that an "increment was 'consumed'.. . where the computer
model calculated the highest concentration of emissions for [a PSD
pollutant]. "107 The court noted that the NSR Workshop Manual
does not require notice for every impact resulting from a source's
emissions, but only for those impacts from sources in which emis-
sions exceed the SIL threshold.108 As a result, the court concluded
that the EHB did not err in holding that the DEP was only required
to provide notice for Class I areas in which the modeled impact of
the Facility's emissions would exceed the SIL threshold. 0 9
D. Mitigation Measures
The Commonwealth Court concluded its analysis by addressing
the issue of whether the EHB erred in determining that the mitiga-
tion measures contained in the Plan Approval adequately protected
visibility in Shenandoah. 110 The court recognized that the FLMs
had an affirmative responsibility to protect visibility in Class I areas,
such as Shenandoah."' Additionally, while the court referred to
evidence showing the FLMs' initial rejection of Wellington's mitiga-
tion plan, it focused on their later acceptance of an enhanced
plan. 112 Based on this evidence, which the court found to be sub-
stantial without giving any additional reasoning, the court affirmed
the EHB's determination regarding the adequate protection of
Shenandoah based upon the Plan Approval's mitigation
measures.113
107. Id. (describing basis for DEP's interpretation). The court explained that
.a proposed source was considered to be a contributing consuming increment if
the emissions that were expected to result were above the SIL threshold during the
period when the increment was the highest from all modeled cumulative impacts."
Id. at 579-80.
108. See id. at 580 (stating requirements for PSD sources in NSR Workshop
Manual).
109. Id. (affirming EHB's decision that DEP only need publish degree of in-
crement consumption for James River Face where SO 2 impact exceeded SIL
threshold). In addition, the court also held that although the DEP had not pub-
lished the degree of increment consumption for James River Face in the initial
notice of the Plan Approval, the supplemental notice was sufficient to cure the
error. Id. The court noted that the supplemental notice "afforded the public and
the Association an opportunity for effective public participation," but no com-
ments were submitted and the Association did not raise its objections at the de novo
hearing. Id.
110. See id. at 583 (explaining final issue addressed by Commonwealth
Court).
111. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 583 (listing FLM's duties under PSD regulations).
112. See id. at 584-85 (discussing actions of Shenandoah's FLM).
113. Id. at 585 (finding substantial evidence to support EHB's holding).
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V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. Approval of CFB Facility
Although the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania in Groce
addressed a variety of issues, the overarching issue was whether the
DEP properly approved Wellington's plan for a CFB facility.
1 14
Based on substantial evidence supporting both the DEP and EHB's
findings, the court properly affirmed the EHB's dismissal of the As-
sociation's appeal.1 15 The court's holding in Groce demonstrates
the importance of deferring to the EHB when reviewing an EHB
decision and only overturning such a decision if it is unsupported
by substantial evidence.116
Therefore, through its affirmation of the EHB decision, the
court properly approved the use of CFB combustors because of the
substantial evidence of the advantages of CFB combustors over
other, more traditional coal-burning facilities.11 7 One such advan-
tage, exemplified by the CFB facility currently operating in Jackson-
ville, FL, is that CFB combustors produce much lower emissions of
dangerous air pollutants, such as SO 2 and NO,, than their more
traditional coal-burning counterparts.' 1 8 The design of CFB com-
bustors, and more specifically the injection of limestone into the
bed burning the coal, leads to reduced pollutant emissions and
eliminates the need for more expensive emissions controls. 11 9
The more significant advantage of CFB combustors, however,
is that unlike other conventional combustors, they are equipped to
handle lower-grade coals, such as waste coal, as a fuel source.
1 20
This quality enables CFB combustors to make use of an essentially
free fuel supply: waste coal located near the site of the facility which
114. See id. at 570 (stating Association's general argument against DEP and
EHB).
115. See id. at 585 (affirming decision of EHB, thereby affirming decision of
DEP).
116. See 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 704 (West 2007) (establishing standard of
review); for a further discussion of the standard of review for EHB decisions, see
supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
117. For a further discussion of the benefits of CFB combustors over other
coal-burning facilities, such as PC boilers, see supra notes 50-58 and accompanying
text.
118. See U.S. Department of Energy, supra note 50 at 4 (describing advantages
of CFB combustors over traditional combustors); see also U.S. Department of En-
ergy, supra note 44 (describing positive performance of Jacksonville facility).
119. See U.S. Department of Energy, supra note 50 (describing benefits of
limestone in CFB design).
120. See id. (stating CFB combustor's ability to use low-quality fuels); see U.S.
Department of Energy, supra note 44 (explaining Jacksonville facility's ability to
burn low-grade coals and waste by-products as advantage to facility).
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is severely damaging the environment.' 2' As a result, the ability of
CFB combustors to use waste coal enables CFB facilities to simulta-
neously produce energy with reduced pollutant emissions and alle-
viate the environmental dangers of waste coal.' 22
This evidence of the function and advantages of CFB facilities
illustrates the propriety of the court's affirmation of the EHB's deci-
sion.123 The court relied on the substantial differences between PC
boilers and CFB combustors in concluding that the DEP had acted
correctly in designating the CFB combustor as its own class or cate-
gory. 124 Additionally, in upholding the EHB's findings that the Fa-
cility would meet the most stringent emissions limitations, the court
analyzed the effect a CFB combustor's physical characteristics had
on pollutant emissions. 125 Therefore, because the court's decisions
were based on substantial, concrete evidence demonstrating the op-
erational and environmental advantages of CFB combustors, it
properly affirmed the EHB's decision by upholding the DEP's Plan
Approval of the Facility.126
B. DEP's Interpretations
Throughout Groce, the court addressed many of the DEP's stat-
utory interpretations that came before the EHB. 127 Pennsylvania
case law establishes that agencies are to be given deference when
interpreting statutes they are responsible for enforcing.' 28 Moreo-
ver, in this case, the DEP interpreted the statutes in such a way that
entitled it to deference by both the EHB and Commonwealth Court
121. See Ivanovich, supra note 51 (stating harms of waste coal and how CFB
combustors will make use of waste coal).
122. Id. (describing CFB plant's ability to use waste coal and produce fewer
emissions).
123. See Groce v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 921 A.2d 567, 573-74 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2007) (listing Association's grounds for appeal).
124. See id. at 575 (describing differences between PC boilers and CFB
combustors).
125. See id. at 576-77 (finding Facility achieved lowest emission rate in its
class).
126. See 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 704 (West 2007) (establishing standard of
review for EHB decisions); see also Groce, 921 A.2d at 575-76 (finding substantial
evidence to support decision of EHB).
127. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 574-80 (examining DEP interpretations of statutory
language). The court examined the DEP's interpretations of "class or category,"
cause or contribute," and "degree of increment consumption." Id.
128. See SUNOCO, Inc. v. Dep't of EnvtL Prot., 865 A.2d 960, 970 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2005) (recognizing standard of agency deference by courts); see also Oley Twp.
v. Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 710 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (quoting
Hatchard v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 612 A.2d 621, 624 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992)) (recog-
nizing agency's statutory interpretation will not be overturned unless found to be
clearly erroneous).
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of Pennsylvania. 129 As the court recognized in previous cases, the
language of a statute is not to be ignored when it is clear and unam-
biguous.130 Furthermore, DEP interpretations have been upheld as
long as they are not arbitrary or unreasonable.' 3'
In Groce, however, the court was presented with several in-
stances where statutory language was not necessarily clear and no
case law or regulation provided any guidance. 32 Nevertheless, the
methods the DEP undertook in interpreting the ambiguous lan-
guage followed previous appropriate interpretations, and thus the
court appropriately affirmed the EHB's decision to accept those
interpretations. 133
Presented with no guidance on what "class or category" was
meant to include, the DEP in Groce undertook a factual analysis of
the coal-burning system involved in the Facility's plan as compared
to other systems. 134 Due to the significant differences between CFB
combustors and other coal-burning systems, the DEP determined
that CFB combustors should be classified as a separate class or cate-
gory.' 35 This analysis enabled the DEP to base its determination on
the actual characteristics and functions of various coal-burning sys-
tems, which allowed the DEP to come to a "reasonable" conclusion
based on the facts. 136 For this reason, the court properly affirmed
the EHB, which accepted the DEP's interpretation of "class or cate-
gory," since that interpretation was neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable. 13 7
Additionally, the court appropriately deferred to the DEP's in-
terpretation of the term "contribute," because the plain meaning of
the term is clear and the DEP's interpretation was neither arbitrary
129. See SUNOCO, 865 A.2d at 970 (explaining DEP's interpretations of stat-
utes for determining allowable emissions).
130. See Brunner v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 869 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2005) (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(b) (West (2007)) (explaining stan-
dard of statutory interpretation).
131. See SUNOCO, 865 A.2d at 970 (stating reasons for upholding EHB's
ruling).
132. Groce, 921 A.2d at 574-80 (recognizing definitions of statutory terms were
not provided in state or federal laws or regulations).
133. See id. (setting forth DEP interpretations of terms at issue in Groce).
134. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 575 (examining CFB combustors and PC boilers).
135. See id. (finding substantial evidence supporting CFB combustors as class
or category).
136. See id. (analyzing factual differences in properties of regular coal and
waste coal).
137. See id. (affirming EHB's decision based on substantial supporting evi-
dence); see also SUNOCO, Inc. v. Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., 865 A.2d 960, 970 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2005) (giving reasons for validity of interpretation).
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nor unreasonable. 138 Although the Association called for a stan-
dard where any emission would "cause or contribute" to air pollu-
tion, the DEP's interpretation only included significant
contributions. 39 In support of its interpretation, the DEP relied on
the NSR Workshop Manual, which stated that a source would not
cause or contribute to pollution "if its own impact is not
significant."' 40
The difference in the court's analysis of the DEP's interpreta-
tions of "contribute" and "class or category," however, is that the
court had a plain meaning of "contribute" to reference. 141 The
court defined "contribute" as "to play a significant part in bringing
about an end or result."'142 In this way, the DEP's interpretation of
"contribute" fit squarely within the definition offered by the
court. 14 3 Thus, the court properly affirmed the EHB because the
DEP's interpretation of "contribute" did not disregard or deviate
from the plain meaning of the term as it was used in the statute.144
VI. IMPACT
A. Future Use of CFB Combustors
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Groce
has implications beyond allowing Wellington to build its facility; its
holding greatly impacts the future of CFB combustors in Penn-
sylvania. 145 While the court did not eliminate DEP approval as a
threshold requirement for construction of such a facility in Penn-
sylvania, the court's decision nevertheless expresses an underlying
approval of CFB combustion facilities. 146 Consequently, the court's
138. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 576-78 (describing and affirming DEP's interpreta-
tion of "cause or contribute").
139. See id. at 576-77 (stating Association and DEP's competing
interpretations).
140. Id. at 577 n.17 (emphasis added) (stating provisions of NSR Workshop
Manual in regards to PSD requirements).
141. See id. at 578 (examining regulations versus statements of policy relating
to DEP's interpretation of term "contribute").
142. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 285 (1989))
(defining term "contribute") (emphasis added).
143. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 577-78 (giving DEP's interpretation of term "con-
tribute" and Commonwealth Court's definition of same term).
144. See id. (stating DEP's interpretation of term "contribute"); see also Brunner
v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 869 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (holding plain
meaning of statute must not be disregarded); see also Prevention of Significant De-
terioration of Air Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (k) (2007) (setting requirements for a
new source to receive a Plan Approval).
145. See generally Groce, 921 A.2d at 567 (affirming EHB decision to uphold
DEP plan approval).
146. See generally id. at 567 (affirming DEP's plan approval of Facility).
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ultimate holding is in accord with numerous findings that CFB
combustors present a hopeful and viable solution to dangerous
waste coal while simultaneously protecting the environment from
significant air pollution. 147
The court's review of the Facility in Groce, however, presents a
potential caveat to this implicit approval of CFB combustors: pro-
posals for future CFB combustion facilities must contain the same
characteristics and exhibit similar environmental benefits as the
Wellington Facility.148 The court in Groce found substantial evi-
dence of the CFB combustor's superiority over other traditional
combustors in its ability to process waste coal.1 49 The court also
found it significant that the Facility had achieved the lowest emis-
sion rate among other facilities in its class.1 50 Related to the emis-
sions of the Facility, the court further noted that the amount of SO 2
emitted by the Facility would not have more than a de minimis effect
on surrounding pollution levels.15'
For the foregoing reasons, evidence of the CFB combustion fa-
cility's superiority in relation to other coal-burning facilities was
critical to the court's affirmation of the EHB.152 Consequently, fu-
ture CFB combustor projects will likely be able to gain approval
only when the facility shares the same benefits and positive charac-
147. See id. at 575 (detailing CFB combustor's ability to use waste coal as fuel
source and burn at low temperatures, limiting emissions); see also DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, supra note 50 at (describing advantages of CFB combustors over tradi-
tional combustors); see also Pelton, supra note 52 (estimating Pennsylvania has 250
million tons of waste coal throughout state that will be burned using power
plants); see also Ivanovich, supra note 51 (stating harms of waste coal and how CFB
combustors will make use of waste coal).
148. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 575-76 (recognizing CFB's ability to use waste coal
as fuel source and CFB's achievement of lowest emission rate in class); see also
Ivanovich, supra note 51 (finding that new CFB facility would use 3.5 million tons
of waste coal per year and could clean up waste coal within 16 years). For a further
discussion of CFB combustors, see supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
149. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 575 (describing differences between CFB combus-
tors and PC boilers). For a further discussion on waste coal and the environmental
dangers it poses, see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
150. Groce, 921 A.2d at 575 (finding emission rate for NO, of 0.1lb/MMBTU
by Facility to be lowest achieved in practice). For a further discussion of emissions
created by coal-burning facilities, see supra notes 22 and 49 and accompanying text.
151. Groce, 921 A.2d at 577 (affirming EHB's findings that Facility's emissions
would have de minimis impact). For a further discussion of SILs and de minimis
impact, see supra endnote 89-101 and accompanying text.
152. See generally Groce, 921 A.2d at 575-77 (holding that evidence supported
DEP's finding that Facility was deserving of its own class or category, that Facility
had achieved lowest emissions in class, and emissions from Facility had de minimis
effect).
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teristics as the Facility in Groce.153 Based upon the court's underly-
ing approval of the Facility, as well as the numerous advantages
inherent in CFB combustor technology, CFB combustors will likely
have a future in Pennsylvania as a viable and beneficial means of
generating power.154
B. Statutory Guidance
Although the court's analysis of the DEP's statutory interpreta-
tions in Groce was helpful to the issue before the court, the court's
analysis is also significant for what it did not do. 155 Regarding "class
or category" and "degree of increment consumption," the Court
recognized that no definitions of the phrases existed in state or fed-
eral laws or regulations. 56 Notably, the court did not attempt to
undertake an in-depth examination of the undefined phrases, but
instead affirmed the EHB's decision based upon sufficient eviden-
tiary support.157
As a result, although the court did not establish set definitions
that could guide agencies in the future, it implicitly reaffirmed the
previously adopted standard of statutory review. 158 In reviewing
whether CFB combustors constituted their own "class or category,"
the court, by affirming the EHB, accepted the DEP's interpretation
because it was based upon a factual analysis of different coal-burn-
ing systems. 159 As such, the court implicitly held that an agency's
statutory interpretation must not be arbitrary, thereby implying that
future interpretations of "class or category" must be based upon
153. See id. at 575 (differentiating characteristics of PC boilers from different,
positive characteristics of CFB combustors).
154. See generally id. at 585 (affirming EHB's dismissal of Association's chal-
lenge to Wellington's CFB facility); see also Pelton, supra note 52 (estimating Penn-
sylvania has 250 million tons of waste coal); see also Ivanovich, supra note 51
(recognizing that CFB combustion technology can use harmful waste coal as fuel).
155. See generally Groce, 921 A.2d at 574-75, 579 (analyzing terms "class or cate-
gory" and "degree of increment consumption").
156. Id. (noting lack of guidance in court's analysis).
157. See id. at 575 (accepting DEP's interpretation that CFB combustors con-
stituted independent class or category and degree of increment consumption only
required significant consumptions be reported).
158. See Brunner v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 869 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2005) (holding agency's interpretation is invalid by adding words to statute, and
that plain meaning of statute will not be disregarded); see also Sunoco v. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 865 A.2d 960, 970 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (affirming DEP interpreta-
tion where interpretation was not arbitrary or unreasonable).
159. See Groce, 921 A.2d at 574-75 (describing differences between CFB com-
bustors. and PC boilers).
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substantial evidence. 16°1 This standard was reiterated in the court's
analysis of "degree of increment consumption," where the court
again implicitly found that the DEP's interpretation of the phrase
was not arbitrary, since it was based upon provisions in the NSR
Workshop Manual for when an increment is consumed.' 6 1
Consequently, although the Commonwealth Court of Penn-
sylvania declined to provide meanings for undefined phrases, the
court nevertheless reinforced evidentiary and reasonableness stan-
dards for statutory interpretations. 162 Thus, Groce offers guidance
not only to entities wishing to construct CFB facilities in Penn-
sylvania, but also to agencies, such as the DEP, when interpreting
statutes.1 63
David Samlin
160. See id. at 575 (validating DEP's interpretation of "class or category" as
relating to CFB combustors).
161. See id. at 579 (explaining NSR Workshop Manual's provision for when
increment is consumed).
162. See id. at 575, 579 (affirming EHB because DEP's interpretations were
based on substantial evidence and were not arbitrary).
163. See id. at 575 (finding substantial evidence as critical factor in affirmation
of EHB).
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